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二道に疎の福と天性

圍碁を好みうのりて

一族の笹山檢校言

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盲人の關親

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Go World News

International News

The 2nd LG Cup

O Rissei defeats Yoo Chang-hyuk 3-2

On March 23, O Rissei won the fifth and final game of the match to determine this year's LG Cup world champion. This is O's first international title. Last year he was the runner-up in the Fujitsu Cup.

O was born in Taiwan on November 7, 1958. He came to Japan in 1971 as a student of Kano Yoshinori 9-dan. The following year he became shodan and reached 9-dan in 1988. In Japan, where he is a member of the Nihon Ki-in player, he is one of the top players and has won numerous titles, the biggest of which was the Oza title in 1995.

This was the second year in a row that Yoo was the finalist in this cup. Last year he played Lee Chang-ho and lost the match 3-0.

Full results:

Game 1. Feb. 25, 1998. Yoo by 7 1/2 points.

Game 2. Feb. 26. O by resignation.

Game 3. Mar. 18. Yoo by resignation.

Game 4. Mar. 20. O won by resignation.

Game 5. Mar. 23. O by 8 1/2 points.

The 9th Tong Yang Securites Cup

Lee and Yoo to Meet in the Final Match

Lee Chang-ho and Yoo Chang-hyuk won their semifinal games and will face each other in the final of the Tong Yang Securities Cup. In the quarterfinals, played on March 27, 1998. Lee beat Rin Kaiho and Yoo defeated Japan's number one player Cho Chikun. In the other two games Ryu Shikun beat Lee Sung-jae and Yu Bin beat Michael Redmond.

In the semifinals, played on March 29, Yoo beat Ryu Shikun and Lee beat Yu Bin.

The first two games were played on April 20 and 22, 1998. Lee won the first and Yoo the second.

The final three games are scheduled for May 11, 13, and 15.

The 11th Fujitsu Cup

The 1998 Fujitsu Cup has begun. The first round was played on April 11, 1998 and the second two days later.

Sixteen players qualified for the first round by winning their national or regional tournaments or being chosen by their national organizations. Those players are as follows:

Japan:

Hikosaka Naoto, Kiyonari Tetsuya, Ryu Shikun 7-dan, Cho Ri-yu 2-dan.

China:

Shao Weigang 8-dan, Yu Bin, and Chang Hao 8-dan.

Korea:

Lee Chang-ho, Cho Hoon-hyun, Seo Bong-soo, Yoo Chang-hyuk, Choi Myung-hoon 6-dan.

Taiwan:

Chou Chun-hsun 7-dan

Europe:

Taranu Catalin 2-dan

North America:

Michael Redmond 8-dan

South America:

Fernando Aguilar amateur 6-dan

Seeds

In addition to the above, eight players are seeded into the second round. They are selected according to the results in the previous tournament. The players who came first, second, and third are personally seeded; The other five seeds go to the countries who took fourth to eighth places.

Besides Kobayashi Koichi, O Rissei, and Ma Xiaochun, who took the first three places last year, Japan had the right to designate three seeds because of its good results (five of its players placed in the top eight). They were Cho Chikun, Ishida Yoshio, and Yamashiro Hiroshi. The other seeds were all from China. They were Ding Wei 6-dan and Zhou Heyang 8-dan.

Prize Money

First Place: ¥20,000,000

Second Place: ¥7,000,000

Third Place: ¥4,000,000

Fourth Place: ¥2,000,000

Winners of the quarterfinals: ¥1,000,000

Winners of the second round: ¥600,000

Winners of the first round: ¥300,000

Total prize money: ¥44,200,000



Hoping to make up for last year's dismal showing. The Korean team at the Fujitsu Cup drawing: from left, Choi Myung-hoon, Yoo Chang-hyuk, Seo Bong-soo, Cho Hoon-hyun, and Lee Chang-ho.

Conditions of Play

All games are played using the Japanese rules.

Time limit: 3 hours for each player.

Komi: 5 1/2 points.

Results of the first two rounds

Round One (April 11)

Lee Chang-ho beat Taranu Catalin
Cho Hoon-hyun beat Chou Chun-hsun
Yoo Chang-hyuk beat Fernando Aguilar
Chang Hao beat Kiyonari Tetsuya
Yu Bin beat Cho Riyeu
Ryu Shikun beat Shao Weigang
Hikosaka Naoto beat Choi Myung-hoon
Michael Redmond beat Seo Bong-soo

Michael Redmond, who represented North America in this tournament, had a very good week. Besides his win in the first round of this tournament, two days earlier, on April 9, he beat Cho Chikun in the third preliminary section of the Oza tournament.

The big surprise in the second round was the defeat of last year's champion Kobayashi Koichi by China's star player, Chang Hao.

Round Two (April 13)

Chang Hao beat Kobayashi Koichi
O Rissei beat Michael Redmond

Yu Bin beat Cho Chikun

Lee Chang-ho beat Ishida Yoshio

Cho Hoon-hyun beat Yamashiro Hiroshi

Ma Xiaochun beat Ryu Shikun

Yoo Chang-hyuk beat Zhou Heyang

Hikosaka Naoto beat Ding Wei

The quarterfinals will be held on June 5, 1998. The pairings are:

Lee Chang-ho vs. Yu Bin

Hikosaka Naoto vs. Cho Hoon-hyun

Yoo Chang-hyuk vs. Ma Xiaochun

O Rissei vs. Chang Hao

The 4th Bohai Cup: Rui Naiwei Wins the Women's World Championship

The best-of-three final of the 4th Bohai Cup, the women's world professional championship, was held on April 6 and 8, 1998 in Korea. The finalists this year were Rui Naiwei 9-dan and Feng Yun 9-dan. Rui won the match with two straight wins. This is the third time she has won this cup, which reinforces her claim to being the strongest woman player in the world.

Feng Yun, who was promoted to 9-dan last year, is the strongest female player active in Chinese tournaments. Rui now lives in California with her husband, Jiang Zhujiu 9-dan.

News from Japan

The 22nd Kisei Title Match Cho Defends His Title

It looked as if this year's Kisei title was going to be a one-sided affair, with Cho sweeping the series. In the third game, a complicated large-scale capturing race broke out at the top. Yoda should have won it, but he made a mistake and it was Cho who captured a large group of stones. Now Cho had won the first three games and Yoda appeared to be demoralized. It seemed as if Yoda was outclassed and nobody gave him a chance, but he came back to win the fourth and fifth games to keep his hopes alive. In the sixth game, however, he was completely outplayed and Cho left no doubt in anyone's mind that he is the number one player in Japan. A complete report of the title match will be given in the next issue.

The results of the match:

Game 1: Jan. 14-15, 1998. Cho by resignation.

Game 2: Jan. 28-29. Cho by 3 1/2 points

Game 3: Feb. 4-5. Cho by resignation.

Game 4: Feb. 18-19. Yoda by resignation.

Game 5: Feb. 25-26. Yoda by resignation.

Game 6: Mar. 11-12. Cho by 4 1/2 points.

The 35th Judan Title Match Hikosaka Takes the Title from Kato

Hikosaka Naoto is the new star on the Japanese tournament scene. On April 23, he

defeated Kato Masao in the fifth and final game of the Judan title match to take his first title.

At the age of 36, Hikosaka seems to have come into his own. Last year, he had very good results, winning 44 games and losing only 15 for an excellent 74.5 winning percentage. He has been a member of the the Honinbo league for the last two years. On the international scene he is also making his presence felt. He reached the quarterfinals in the 2nd Samsung Cup and has made it to the quarterfinals in this year's Fujitsu Cup. However, taking this title is Hikosaka's first major success.

His quest for the Judan title actually began with a defeat at the hands of Kobayashi Satoru last spring in the first round of its double-knockout tournament to decide the challenger. But he came to life in the losers' section and defeated some of the top names in Japanese go: Fujisawa Shuko, O Rissei, and, finally, the great Cho Chikun. (Cho is the only player who has ever held the top four titles simultaneously, but he missed out on his chance of repeating this feat.)

The results of the title match:

Game 1. Mar. 5, 1998. Kato by 4 1/2 points.

Game 2. Mar. 24. Hikosaka by 3 1/2 points.

Game 3. Apr. 8. Hikosaka by 4 1/2 points.

Game 4. Apr. 16. Kato by resignation.

Game 5. Apr. 23. Hikosaka by 1 1/2 points.



The start of the sixth and final game of the 22nd Kisei title match. Despite of Yoda's determined fightback, Cho was too strong for him to overcome a three-game deficit.

53rd Honinbo League (Title-holder: Cho Chikun)

Rank		KM	RS	HN	CS	KS	OR	OM	YK	Won	Lost
1	Kato Masao		●	●	●	●	○	●	○	2	5
2	Ryu Shikun	○		●	○	●	●	○	●	3	4
3	Hikosaka Naoto	○	○		○	○	●	●	●	4	3
4	Cho Sonjin	●	○	●		●	●	●	●	1	6
5	Kobayashi Satoru	○	○	●	○		●	○	●	4	3
5	O Rissei	●	○	○	○	○		●	○	5	2
5	O Meien	○	●	○	○	●	○		○	5	2
5	Yamada Kimio	●	○	○	○	○	●	●		4	3

The 53rd Honinbo League O Rissei Becomes the Challenger

This year's Honinbo league finished with two Taiwanese players, O Rissei and O Meien, compiling identical scores of five wins to two losses, necessitating a playoff. It was held on April 6 and O Rissei won it and the right to challenge Cho for the title.

This is the first time that O has challenged for a best-of-seven title. He challenged Cho in the best-of-five Oza title match in 1995 and beat him 3-0, so there is no question that he will be a dangerous challenger. Moreover, O is having excellent results this year: he won the LG Cup and has made a good start in the Meijin league.

However, Cho will be no pushover. He is a different player in the top-three titles, with their two-day games, and he is probably determined to surpass Takagawa's nine straight Honinbo titles and take this title for the tenth consecutive time.

Kobayashi Satoru and Yamada Kimio also finished with identical 4-3 scores, again necessitating a playoff to decide who would be dropped from the league. Kobayashi won, so Yamada was dropped. Kato Masao, Ryu Shikun, and Cho Sonjin ended with negative scores and were dropped.

The first game of the title match will be played on May 21 and 22 and the seventh and final game — if the match goes that far — is scheduled for July 22 and 23.

23rd Meijin League (Title-holder: Cho Chikun)

Rank		KK	OR	KS	RS	TM	KM	YN	RK	TH	Won	Lost
1	Kobayashi Koichi			●	○		○	●	○		3	2
2	O Rissei					○	○		○	○	4	0
3	Kataoka Satoshi	○			○	●		●		●	2	3
4	Ryu Shikun	●		●		○				○	2	2
5	Takemiya Masaki		●	○	●			○	●		2	3
6	Kato Masao	●	●					●	○	○	2	3
7	Yoda Norimoto	○		○		●	○			○	4	1
7	Rin Kaiho	●	●			○	●				1	3
7	Tono Hiroaki		●	○	●		●	●			1	4

The 23rd Meijin League

The players in the 23rd Meijin league to determine the challenger to Cho Chikun Meijin have been decided. Two players, Rin Kaiho and Yoda Norimoto, have won their way back into the league after being dropped. This is Rin's 35th consecutive appearance in the Meijin league or as a title holder. The third player to win his way in this year is Tono Hiroaki 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in, who is making his second appearance in the league. His other appearance was in 1982.

At press time, O Rissei leads the league with four wins, but Yoda Norimoto is right behind with three wins to one loss and former Meijin and last year's challenger Kobayashi Koichi has three wins to two losses.

New from Korea

Lee Chang-ho continues to dominate the Korean tournament scene. Cho Hoon-hyun is his main rival, but Seo Bong-soo and Yang Jae-ho each got through a preliminary tournament to try their hand at unseating Lee from one of his many titles. No one had any success! Lee clearly towers over his compatriots, while Cho Hoon-hyun seems to be the only competition he can get locally.

Here is a roundup of the recent Korean title matches with dates of the deciding games.

41st Guksu (National Champion)

Lee Chang-ho defeated Seo Bong-soo 3-1 on December 12, 1997.

2nd Bacchus Cup: Chun Won (Tengen)

Lee Chang-ho defeated Cho Hoon-hyun 3-2 on December 13, 1997.

19th Gukgi (National Go) Championship

Lee Chang-ho defeated Yang Jae-ho 3-0 on December 16, 1997.

The 5th Paedal Title

Lee Chang-ho defeated Cho Hoon-hyun 3-1 on January 13, 1998

15th Daewang (Great King)

Lee Chang-ho defeated Cho Hoon-hyun 3-1 on January 19, 1998.

9th Kisung (Kisei) Title

Lee Chang-ho defeated Cho Hoon-hyun 3-2 on February 9, 1998.

37th Chaigowi (Top Position) Title

The two games in this best-of-three title match were played on March 5 and 19, 1998. Lee Chang-ho defeated Cho Hoon-hyun 2-0.

News from China

The 12th Tianyuan Title Match

Chang Hao Defends His Title

The best-of-five Tianyuan (=Tengen) title match was held from March 3 to March 10, with a game being played every two days. This is a rather frantic pace compared to the leisurely Japanese custom where there is at least a week between title-match games. This year's challenger was Wang Lei 7-dan. Wang started off the series with a bang by beating the title holder Chang Hao in the first two games, but Chang rallied and won the final three games of the match to defend his title 3-2.

From the Editor

Over the years the main emphasis of *Go World* has been reporting on games from the major title matches in Japan and, more recently, Korea. As a result, we have neglected our kyu-level readers, who would probably like to see more instructional articles to raise their go-playing strength.

As of this issue, half of the magazine will be devoted to game commentaries and the other half to instructional articles that we hope will raise the playing strength of our weaker readers to shodan.

In these articles, every aspect of go will be covered, from the opening to the endgame. The series on tesuji starts with ladders and nets and will eventually cover every type of tesuji. We will also provide a thorough analysis of many basic josekis and you can also expect great improvement in your analytical and calculating powers by solving the endgame problems presented on 5x5 boards.

This issue's featured article is Michael Redmond's detailed analysis of the niren-sei opening. This piece should appeal to both kyu- and dan-level players.

We welcome feedback from our readers so that over the next few issues we can adjust the content of *Go World* to everyone's satisfaction.

International Tournaments

The 2nd Samsung Cup Final

Lee Chang-ho vs. Kobayashi Satoru

For the second time within the span of a year, Kobayashi Satoru reached the final of a major international tournament and again he lost all of his games. (Last March and April, he lost to Cho Hoon-hyun in the Tong Yang Securities Cup final. See *Go World* 79.)

This time his opponent was the formidable Lee Chang-ho. Lee was the favorite, but Kobayashi couldn't be counted out since he had beaten Lee in the semifinals of last year's Tong Yang Securities Cup. In the end, however, Kobayashi went down to defeat without drawing blood.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Satoru

Black: Lee Chang-ho

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 3 hours each.

Played on November 24, 1997 in Seoul.

Figure 1 (1-25). *A difficult game for White.*

Erasing with 24 was a bad move. White should have invaded the corner at A. After Black 25, the game became difficult for White.




Figure 1 (1-25)

Figure 2 (26-58). *Living in the corner*

Up to 38, White ends up with a heavy group. Instead of peeping with 31, Black could cut at 1 in *Dia. 1*. White lives with the sequence to 10, but Black gets thickness in the center. This result is not good for White either.







Figure 2 (26-58)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Instead of 46, it is dangerous for White to confine the black stones to the corner with 1 in *Dia. 2*, then try to kill them with 7 and 9.

Black can escape by linking up with 10. If White pursues him with the moves from 11, Black captures four stones when he hanes with 28.

Instead of 5 in *Dia. 2*, it would be better to descend to 1 in *Dia. 3*. Black can live in a ko with the sequence White A-Black B-White C-Black E after he blocks at 10. Still, it was better for White to play as he did in the game.





Figure 3 (59-82)

Figure 3 (59-82). A strong move by Lee

Black 63 was a strong move, severely attacking the invading white stones. White could live in the corner with the sequence to 4 in *Dia. 4*, but he gets a small life and ends in gote, while Black's position is thick. However, this would have been better than the sequence to 82 in the game.



Dia. 4

Figure 4 (83-118). Attacking the white group

Black prepared to attack the white stones in the center by peeping with 83. He then sacrificed his three stones at the top with the sequence to 89 so as to build a wall, blocking White's escape route.






Figure 4 (83-118)



Dia. 5

10: at 3



Dia. 6

The sequence in *Dia. 5* shows a more severe way for Black to attack. Black increases the sacrifice by squeezing White with the se-

quence from 1 to 9. Next, White is forced to capture the black stones with 20, but after Black 21, the white stones at the bottom are trapped.

Instead of 14 in *Dia. 5*, cutting with White 1 in *Dia. 6* fails. After the sequence to 13, the net around the white stones at the bottom is tighter than before.

After White 90, Black went all out to attack the white stones with 91.





Figure 5 (119-151)

Figure 5 (119-151). *Timing*

The timing of Black 23 was important. If White were to make the exchanges of White A-Black B and White C-Black D in *Dia. 7*, White could answer Black 25 in the figure with 1. After Black 12, White could kill the black stones by playing at E.



Dia. 7




Figure 6 (152-234)

White 234: connects at the marked stone

Figure 6 (152-234).

Black wins by 5 1/2 points.

Game Two

White: Lee Chang-ho

Black: Kobayashi Satoru

Played on November 26, 1997 in Seoul.





Figure 1 (1-33)


Figure 1 (1-33). *A regrettable move*

Kobayashi: 'I was very dissatisfied with this game. I especially regretted Black 31. I should have played the sequence from Black 1 to 5 in *Dia. 1*. This would have given me a good game. In spite of this bad move, however, the game was not lost.'



Dia. 1

one of several variations that would have enabled Kobayashi to get a good game. If Black had played 43 at 1 in *Dia. 3*, it would still have been an even fight.



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (34-76)

Figure 2 (34-76). *Black falls into a deep pit.*

Kobayashi: 'Black 39 and 43 were even worse than Black 31 in *Figure 1*. When White cut at 46, the game was over. It was close, but Black had no chance.'



Dia. 2

Instead of 39, Black should have played the shoulder hit of 1 in *Dia. 2*. This was just




Figure 3 (77-100)




Figure 4 (101-172)

Black resigns after White 172.

Game Three

Kobayashi: 'In the first two games, I didn't play where I wanted to — for some reason I changed my mind just before making my move — so I felt dissatisfied. Now I was one game from defeat in this match. Winning or losing didn't matter; I only wanted to play a good game.'

White: Kobayashi Satoru

Black: Lee Chang-ho

Played on November 28, 1997 in Seoul.




Figure 1 (1-27)

Figure 1 (1-27). A Korean-style joseki

The sequence to Black 27 is a Korean-style joseki.






Figure 2 (28-52)

Figure 2 (28-52). The best point

If White is going to play on the left, 28 is the best point. If White plays 1 in *Dia. 1*, he must come back and play at A after Black cuts through with 2 and plays the sequence to 6.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Extending to White 1 in *Dia. 2* is lukewarm. It allows Black to map out territory, using his marked stone on the left side, with 2. White can then extend to 3, but the black corner enclosure prevents him from gaining any profit and he ends in gote.

Figure 3 (53-72). A move only Lee could make

The highlight of this game was the sequence from Black 53 to 71, where Black gave up his stones in the corner for the three white stones on the side. In this sequence, the cut of 67 was the climatic move. When 67 was played, a sudden silence fell over the press-room. Everyone was astonished. Somebody even blurted out 'what a stupid move.' But after a bit of analysis, they were able to understand Lee's intention. Then, instead of derision and astonishment, nothing but praise for this move could be heard.






Figure 3 (53-72)



Dia. 3

Instead of 67, if Black defended the corner with 1 in *Dia. 3*, White would extend to 2 and Black's group here would be left without eyes. On the other hand, if Black played 1 in *Dia. 4*, White would cut at 62, killing the black stones in the corner.




Dia. 4

After Black 67, White might play 1 in *Dia. 5*. Black ataris with 2, then defends the corner


with 4. White next caps with 5, but Black makes shape by forcing with 6, then expands his moyo on the right with 8 and 10 — Black has an unassailable lead.

These are the reasons why Black 67 was such a good move. Someone in the pressroom quipped: 'Only Lee Chang-ho or someone who didn't understand ladders would play a move like Black 67.'

After the exchange of Black 67 for White 68, the sequence to 71 was inevitable.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

According to Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan, Black 53 was also a wonderful move. Instead of 48, White should have exchanged 1 for Black 2 in *Dia. 6*, then played 3.

Figure 4 (72-100). Two regrettable moves

The two moves that Kobayashi regretted were 72 and 74. He said that Black 72 should have been one line deeper, at 1 in *Dia. 7*. If

Black defended his moyo by extending to 2, White could play 3, putting pressure on the three black stones above.

As for 74, he should have made sabaki by playing at 1 in *Dia. 8*. If Black links up to his stones above with 2, White will attach at 3.

After White attached at 80, it was time for the lunch break. Kobayashi, with slumped shoulders, appeared quite depressed.

Everyone, including the players, agreed that Black was ahead after he attached at 83.





Figure 4 (72-100)



Dia. 7

Dia. 8

Figure 5 (101-148). The game is hopeless.

White cut at 48, but the game was hopeless for Kobayashi. He was now just trying to set the scene for an honorable resignation.

Figure 6 (149-197). Bad aji

White must be careful how he answers Black 71. If he connects at 1 in *Dia. 9*, Black gets profit in sente when he ataris with 2. But if he connects at 1 in *Dia. 10*, the bad aji at the top




Figure 5 (101-148)

comes to life when Black extends to 2 and captures six stones with the sequence to 6.





Figure 6 (149-197)

ko (below 71): 78, 84, 90, 96

ko (at 75): 81, 87, 93



Dia. 9

Dia. 10

White resigns after Black 197.

(Go Weekly 97/12/22 and Baduk, 97/12 and 98/1.)

Korean Tournaments

The 45th Guksu Title Match: Game Four

It has become quite rare these days for title matches in Korean to be contested between players other than Lee Chang-ho and Cho Hoon-hyun. One such match at the end of last year was for the Guksu (National Champion) title, where Seo Bong-soo challenged the title holder Lee Chang-ho. Lee won the title match 3-1, but Seo did manage to convincingly win the third game, preventing a complete wipe-out and preserving his honor.

White: Seo Bong-soo 9-dan

Black: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; **time:** 5 hours each.

Played on November 24, 1997 **in** Seoul.




Figure 1 (1-53)

Figure 1 (1-53). *Black's attack is premature.*

Instead of 19, Black should extend to A. If White pushes with 20, Black will hane at B and take profit. If White plays 20 at 22, Black will get a good result by playing the sequence Black 23-White 24-Black 20. If White next goes on the attack with C, Black can fight by jumping to D.

Black starts a fight in the center with 33, but it is too soon to play so severely. Simply jumping to Black E was better. If White next jumps to 42, Black can attack with F and build a big valley of territory at the bottom.

White takes this opportunity to counterattack with 34 and, with the sequence to 48, he gets thickness in the center.

White 50 was slack. White should have played this move at G, mapping out a large sphere of influence at the top.




Figure 2 (53-100)

Figure 2 (53-100). *Salvaging the position*

Against 55 and 57, putting pressure on Black with White 58 was a good move.

Black 63 to 73 are unorthodox, but they salvage the position in the upper left corner.

The invasion of White 82 is the move that decides the game.

After White plays 96 and 100, his groups on the left side and at the bottom are secure and he has nothing to worry about.




Figure 3 (101-132)

Figure 3 (101–132). *Black is lost.*

When Lee played 7 and 11, it seemed as if he was looking for a way to honorably resign.

With 22, White has caught a large group. After White 32, Black might play the sequence Black A–White B–Black C, but White links up his stones with D.

It's been a long time since Seo has beaten Lee so convincingly.

Black resigns after White 132.

(Igo Koza, February 1998. Translated by the editor.)

The 9th Kisung Title Match: Game Five

The Kisung title is equivalent to the Japanese Kisei, however, unlike in Japan it is not the most prestigious title in Korea and, with its 18,000,000 won (about \$13,000) first prize, it ranks well below the Myungin (Meijin) title with its 40,000,000 won (about \$29,000) first prize.

Lee Chang-ho, the title holder, got off to a bad start in this best-of-five title match, with Cho Hoon-hyun winning the first two games. But as he often does, Lee came back to win the next three games and defend his title.

White: Lee Chang-ho Kisung

Black: Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 point; time: 5 hours each.

Played on February 9, 1998




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50). *The mini-Chinese style opening*

Black makes the mini-Chinese-style formation with the sequence to 7. When White slides to 12, Black forces with 13 to 17, then secures territory in the bottom right with 19.




Figure 2 (51–100)

Figure 2 (51–100). *White makes a large moyo.*

The cut of White 62 is a scary move, but it comes to nothing when Black descends to 63.

Instead of Black 69, cutting at 73 first was the correct order of moves.

In answer to White 78, Black should have played the diagonal move of 80. With the sequence to 86, White has built a wall, confining Black to the side, and has made a large moyo at the top.

Figure 3 (101–200). *Slips by both sides*

Instead of 6, White should have attacked the black stones in the center with 9.

Black 17 at 62 was the correct move. Black's group could then easily live.

Instead of Black 31, connecting at 82 was better. Black could then have avoided the ko in the lower right corner.




Figure 3 (101-200)

50, 56, 64, 70, 76, 84, 90: ko (at 44)
53, 59, 67, 73, 81, 87, 93: ko (at 47); 80: at 71




Figure 4 (201-268)

Figure 4 (201-268). White wins by 1/2 point.

(Igo, May, 1998. Translated by the editor.)

Chinese Tournaments

The 10th Mingren Title Match: Game Four

Although Luo Xihi got off to a good start in the Mingren (Meijin) title match by winning the first game, Ma was obviously too strong for this 18-year-old 6-dan. Below is the fourth game of the match where Ma defended his title for the eighth consecutive time by forcing Luo to resign after 128 moves.

White: Ma Xiaochun Mingren

Black: Luo Xihi 6-dan

Played on November 17, 1998

Figure 1 (1-46). A leisurely game

White 12 and 14 avoids a sharp clash on the right side, aiming to play a leisurely game.

It is more usual for White to play 24 by either pushing up above 23 or crawling to the left of 23. For some reason, Ma preferred to slide at 24.

Black could also play 33 at 35. If White still defends at 34, Black can atari at A. This may be a bit better for Black than in the game.

White 36 was good timing. Black countered with 37 as a precaution against a ladder

that might arise at the bottom.

With 43, Black is threatening to jump to 44. Jumping to Black B would be a bit thin.




Figure 1 (1-46)

Figure 2 (47-106). The losing mover
White 50 was a shrewd invasion.





Figure 2 (47-106)

105: connects at the marked stone

Because of the bad aji of White A, Black 51 was the best response.



Dia. 1

Black 57 was the losing move. Black expected White to answer 59 with 62, but White 60 to 66 was a nice combination to capture White's stones in a ladder.

Black should have played 57 at 1 in *Dia. 1*. After the sequence to 5, the three white stones in the top right are in danger and Black's stones are safe.

Black plays 67 to block the ladder.

Black 74 was a strong move. It would be annoying for White to let Black take this point.

With 79 and 85 Black goes all out to disrupt White territory on the left, but White secures all of his stones on the left with 86 and 88.

After Black 101 to 105, the two black groups on the upper left side are alive, but

White takes away Black's territory in the lower left corner with 106.




Figure 3 (107-128)

Figure 3 (107-128). Black resigns.

After White 28, Black can live with the sequence Black A-White B-Black C-White D-Black E, but White has a comfortable lead, so he resigned.

Black resigns after White 128.

(Igo Koza, February 1998. Translated by the editor.)

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The 22nd Meijin Title Match

Cho Chikun vs. Kobayashi Koichi

For the last 15 years, Cho Chikun and Kobayashi Koichi have been rivals on the Japanese tournament scene and, between them, they have dominated the three biggest Japanese titles — the Kisei, Meijin, and Honinbo. Of all the players in Japan, Kobayashi is considered to be Cho's most dangerous opponent and, if anyone could dislodge him from even one of the top three titles, that person would be Kobayashi.

After splitting the first four games — with Black winning each game — Cho went into the lead by winning the fifth game with white. The sixth game was a cliff-hanger, but, because of two slack moves by Kobayashi, Cho managed to pull off a 3 1/2-point win to defend his title and extend his reign as triple-crown champion.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun Meijin

Black: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Time: 8 hours each; komi: 5 1/2 points.

Played in New York on Sept. 9 and 10, 1997.

Commentary by Kudo Norio, Tengen.




Figure 1 (1-100)

76, 82, 88, 94: take ko at 66;
79, 85, 91: take ko at 73

Figure 1 (1-100). White takes the lead.

The Essex House Hotel Nikko in New York was the scene of this historic battle. Cho and Kobayashi are both territorial players, but it was Cho who played all his opening moves on the third line, made deep invasions at White 38 and 62, then precipitated a ko fight in which he gained much and lost little. Kobayashi wished later that he had played Black 91 at 92, giving up the corner and trying for a huge center.

Figure 2 (101-197). Fatal oversight

Cho continued to play brilliantly, while Kobayashi patiently bided his time. Down to his last chance, Kobayashi invaded at Black 31, but for the next 30 moves Cho defended faultlessly. If he had played White 62 at 78, followed by Black 79, then White 63, Black would probably have resigned. If he had played White 64 one line to the right, the game might have lasted longer, but White would still have won.





Figure 2 (101-197)

Cho did not make these moves because he thought he could save his group with White 1 in *Dia. 1*. That threatens White 'a', killing the corner. If Black defends at 2, White links up with 3, 5, and 7.



Kobayashi (left) and Cho going over the first game.
Seated to the right of Kobayashi are Michael Redmond 8-dan and Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.



Dia. 1

White 1 is a beautiful tesuji, but there is one problem. Black does not play 2, but plays one line to the right, on the point below 'a'. Then after White 7, the lettered sequence from Black 'b' to Black 'h' cuts White apart. Cho realized this when Kobayashi connected at Black 65, and although he saved his group anyway with White 78 to 86, the bottom right corner died.

'I was fooling myself all along, thinking I could link up,' was the first thing Cho said after he resigned.

'I thought something was strange,' Kobayashi replied. Kobayashi then tried to start the post-mortem discussion, but Cho was too stunned by his own oversight. Unable to get any responses out of Cho, Kobayashi turned

to Ishida, the referee. For the next hour and a quarter, Kobayashi and Ishida reviewed the game, while Cho maintained a withdrawn silence. When the review had ended and the others had left, Cho remained sitting motionless in front of the board. Alone in the room, he finally reached for the stones and began a solitary analysis of his defeat.

White resigns after Black 197.

(Abridged from *Kido and Igo Club*, November 1997.)

Game Two

White: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Meijin

Played on September 24 and 25, 1997.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-23)

Figure 1 (1–23). Unusual opening moves

After the shock of a ruined masterpiece in the first game, Cho could hardly have been in good condition for the second game. He chose an unusual formation for Black 1 and 3, but these moves do not relate well to the joseki in the bottom left.




Figure 2 (24–44)

Figure 2 (24–44). The position favors White.

Black 25 aimed at Black A, but A would be more effective if Black's two opening moves on the right side had been on the star points. Black 29 was unexpectedly early. The normal move is Black B.




Figure 3 (45–74)

Figure 3 (45–74). Black refuses to connect.

Cho should have played Black 45 at 46, but apparently his pride wouldn't allow that kind

of connection. Kobayashi's clever cut at White 62 forced Black to fight a two-step ko in the corner. Black 73 and White 74 should both have been played at A.

Figure 4 (75–100). Black in trouble

Black 91 was a tesuji. If White replies at 95, Black jumps to 94, threatening Black A. When White played 100, however, Black was in such bad trouble that one would rather not think about what might happen next.




Figure 4 (75–100)

82: takes ko (above 77); 85: takes ko (at 79);
87: connects (above 77)




Figure 5 (101–130)

Figure 5 (101–130). Temporary respite

Kobayashi played White 16 to prevent Dia. 1 (next page), but he should have played Dia. 2. In retrospect, Black 17 and 19 may have

given Black the lead. Cho commented that after White 30, he could have saved his group easily with Black A–White B–Black C.





Figure 6 (131–166).
51: above 47

Figure 6 (131–166). Confused fighting

Since Black played 31, White created further complications by cutting at 32. Ultimately, Black lived with 51, but this was an elementary blunder. He should have played A, leaving the possibility of Black B–White C–Black D, which would render White eyeless on the side. Ironically, Black 51 may have been the game-winning move, since if Black had played A, White might have been more careful in the confused fighting that followed in the center.

Figure 7 (167–200). White misses his chance.

Black 81 was an overplay. White would probably have won if he had played 92 at A. He would definitely have won if he had

played 96 at 100, capturing Black's group in the center (Black B–White 99–Black C–White D).




Figure 7 (167–200).
80: connects (above 78)

Figure 8 (201–277). End of a long fight

White 4 at 12 would have killed the corner. It's not clear that White would have won that way, but at least that was White's last chance. This game may not have been a masterpiece, but it was a spectacular fight.

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Abridged from Kido, November 1997)




Figure 8 (201–277).
77: connects (above 51)

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun Meijin

Black: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Played on October 1 and 2, 1997.

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1–44). *A courageous move*

Cho rejected standard moves at A and B to play White 20 and, courageously, White 34. After White 36, I would have played Black C, White 40, Black D.




Figure 1 (1–44)

Figure 2 (45–82). *Beautiful timing*

Black 65 was good, but 67 was an overplay. White 70 to 74 were beautifully timed. Black 75 makes one want to weep, but if Black plays 75 at 82, he gets into trouble: White A–Black 75–White 77–Black B–White C.




Figure 2 (45–82)

Figure 3 (83–104). *Desperate moves*

Black 87 and 89 were somewhat desperate, but so was White 90. White 98–Black 99–White 100 would have been adequate here. After White 102, Black can nearly capture the white group with Black A–White B–Black C. White just barely gets away by wedging at D.




Figure 3 (83–104)

Figure 4 (105–118). *Time pressure*

Black 5 pre-empts a sente move by White on the same point (Black A–White B–Black 9–White 10–Black 8–White C wouldn't work). Under time pressure, White replied at 6. He should have played 8, sacrificing the white group below to attack the black group above. Once Black plays 7 (or D), White 8 is too late, but White hasn't lost yet.




Figure 4 (105–118)

Figure 5 (119–149). Mistaken judgment

White 22 was misjudged. White still had excellent chances to win by playing the sequence in *Dia. 1*.





Figure 5 (119–149)

White resigns after Black 149.

(Abridged from *Kido*, November 1997)



Dia. 1

Game Four

White: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Meijin

Played on October 15 and 16, 1997.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1–26). Joseki from the past

The joseki in the top left corner appeared in the game 12 years ago in which Kobayashi won the Meijin title from Cho. Kobayashi had played 18 at 20 then, and Cho had answered at 18, getting a good result. White 22 prevented Black A.




Figure 1 (1–26)





Figure 2 (27–57)

Figure 2 (27–57). Unexpected exchange

A completely unexpected exchange took place in the bottom right. *Dia. 1* shows one of several possible variations. White played 40 because White A–Black 41 would be inferior to this variation. Later on, people said that White should have played 56 at B, but that is arguing from consequences.



Dia. 1
6: connects

Figure 3 (58–85). Black seizes the lead.

Before White 58, Kobayashi could have played White A–Black B–White 59–Black C. White 60 was submissive but necessary, since Black D would threaten to cut at 71. In the top right, White wants to cut with 68 at 69 and play Black E–White 68–Black F–White G, but Black answers White 69 at 68, using a two-stone sacrifice to seal White in tightly. By cutting at 71, Black took the lead.




Figure 3 (58–85)

Figure 4 (86–106). Thrown into confusion

Black 87 was a mistake. White 88 threw the game into confusion. Kobayashi said that instead of White 102, he should have followed the lettered sequence from White A to White

G. Perhaps so, but after White 106, if Black captures 102 at H, White B wins the game.




Figure 4 (86–106)

Figure 5 (107–137). A saving move

Black 7 saved the day, but the game would still have been very close if White had played 16 at 17.




Figure 5 (107–137)

Figure 6 (138–155). A lost liberty

White 44 was a fatal mistake. White lost a liberty and had to resign when Black played 55. Dias. 2 and 3 (next page) show why. Even if White hadn't played 44, he would have lost by 2 1/2 points.

White resigns after Black 155.

(Abridged from Kido, December 1997)




Figure 6 (138-155)





Figure 1 (1-35)



Dia. 2

Dia. 3




Figure 2 (36-62)

Game Five

White: Cho Chikun Meijin
Black: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan
Played on October 22 and 23, 1997.
Commentary by Otake Hideo, 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-35). *Fighting starts early.*

Cho played one of Kobayashi's favorite moves at White 12. I would have chosen White A-Black B-White C. After Black 21, White D-Black E doesn't work well, so Cho compromised with White 22 and 24, but Kobayashi started an immediate fight with Black 25 and 27.

Figure 2 (36-62). *An inspired exchange*

White 42 and 44 were typical of Cho. I would have played 42 at 45 without hesitation. White 46 was incomprehensible. Why not White 61? White played 52, 54, and 56 to rescue the marked stone before Black could enlarge the lower right with Black A. The 54-55 exchange looked bad for White, but it was actually inspired. Kobayashi wished later that he had answered at B, so as not to leave White C, or White D-Black E-White C.

Figure 3 (63-87). *A powerful cut*

With Black threatening to block at A, Black 73 and 75 were a powerful cut. White appeared to be in trouble, but it was Kobayashi's misfortune to figure out that Black 77 would

be necessary if a capturing race developed. Don't ask me why. Since Black played 77, after White linked up with 86 (Black B-White A), Black rushed back to play 87, not expecting Cho to leave the cut at C undefended.




Figure 3 (63-87)

Figure 4 (88-111). Black loses sente.

Thanks to the marked white stone, White was able to answer the cut at 91 with 92, then take the right side while Black was defending the center. To make matters worse, Black gave up sente by playing 107 and 109 before 111.




Figure 4 (88-111)

Figure 5 (112-141). White gets the lead.

With no more weak groups, White was able to force at 12, then play 14 and 16. Ko-

bayashi probably realized at this point that he was going to lose.




Figure 5 (112-141)




Figure 6 (142-170)

Figure 6 (142-170). Gambit declined

White 62 offered the trade shown in *Dia. 1* (next page). Profit and loss are just about evenly balanced. When Black plays 63, White can't connect at A, because after cutting at B, he can't slide to C.

Figure 7 (171-250)

White wins by 3 1/2 points.


(Abridged from Kido, December 1997)



Counting the fifth game. Cho seems to be confident of a win.

Game Six

White: Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan
 Black: Cho Chikun Meijin
 Played on November 5 and 6, 1997.
 Commentary by Cho Chikun.



Dia. 1




Figure 7 (171-250)
 126: connects (at 93)




Figure 1 (1-25)


Figure 1 (1-25). Sidetracked

After trading wins with black, I had finally taken the fifth game with white, but I didn't consider this very significant. Having black doesn't give you the advantage. It does make the opening easier to plan, but although I may start out with a plan, what appears on the

board is never what I intended. Even before my opponent departs from the plan, I depart from it myself. In this game I got sidetracked into reading out a maze of implausible variations. It was simply comic, but let's take things in order.

Black 5 to 11 were played according to plan. These moves were popular at one time, and they had appeared in several of my previous games with Kobayashi.

What about playing Black 17 at 1 in *Dia. 1*? White might reply at 3, or he might slide in at 2. In view of the white thickness below, Black might ignore White 2 to make a pincer at 3. The sequence shown looked playable, and I was tempted to try it, but I don't know whether it's better than what I actually did.



Dia. 1


Dia. 2

I expected the counter-approach at White 18. I didn't think White would play *Dia. 2*. Kobayashi and I have been through that fight before, and it holds no attractions for White. Black 1 in *Dia. 3* also feels wrong, so in the actual game we got into the Kato joseki. This is not the right situation for White to play 22 at A, because Black 22-White B-Black C kills off the white thickness below.

I used up a lot of time thinking about the natural extension at Black 21. One thing I was thinking about was what would happen if I played Black 25 at D. Another thing was the continuation from the Kato joseki, and this is where I got sidetracked.

The sequence usually played is White 1 to 3 in *Dia. 4*, followed by Black 'a' and White 'b',

but what about cutting at Black 4? If that move worked, I thought I'd give it a try, so I read out various continuations from this variation. This was the temptation of the devil, because that cut is unplayable. If it were playable, someone would have played it long ago. The game had barely started and I had already gotten off on the wrong foot, straying down the wrong road.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4

Figure 2 (26-50). *Jolting realization*

The game went as expected through White 28, and here I had read out the sequence in *Dia. 5* (next page), from the cut at Black 1 through White 20. Beyond that point there are problems. White 'a' in *Dia. 6* gets captured by Black 'b', but White 'c'-Black 'd'-White 'e' is sente against the corner, so White can safely





Figure 2 (26-50)

play 'g', which means that the four white stones below are strong. If Black makes the hane and connection at 'h', then White 'e' isn't sente, so White 'g' isn't sente, but Black can't play 'h', because it strengthens White. I mulled over these problems, but *Dia. 5* is fundamentally wrong. There's nothing to it. If White connects at 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black is as good as finished. If Black plays 2 at 6, White just plays 4. Even if Black cuts at 2, the result he gets through White 13 is beneath consideration.




So the whole story was ridiculous. I suddenly realized my mistake and changed plans. If I hadn't realized it and had actually gotten into *Dia. 7*, it would have been a public disgrace.

The jolt of this realization was what made me play Black 31. I should have played Black 1 in *Dia. 8*, the ordinary move that everyone makes. The White 2-Black 3 exchange doesn't hurt a bit. Black is in fine shape if he attacks at 5.

If White plays 4 in *Dia. 9*, Black goes into action at 5 and easily gets settled. After Black 9, Black has a perfect way to link under, at 'a'. White is not likely to bar his path with 1 in *Dia. 10*, because Black jumps to 2 and lives neatly through Black 8.

The move at Black 31 that I played because I was upset just aggravated the wound. From

here on into the next figure, Black was behind. The empty triangle White made at 32 was actually better shape than the hane in *Dia. 8* and 9. If Black cuts with 35 at A, then White connects at B, and Black 31 becomes a terrible waste. The sequence in the game was mandatory, and so was Black 39, to prevent White C.



Someone commented that White should have played 40 at 1 in *Dia. 11*, but that's not the right move. Black will gladly press in at 2. White 1 should at least be at 'a', but that's still a half-measure. White 40 was profound.

Figure 3 (51-81). Missing the point

The result on the right side can be evaluated in various ways, but it can't be good for Black. The root cause was Black 31, which I played in an emotional reaction to my reading

mistake. In this figure, however, Kobayashi made some slight misjudgments, and I caught up.






Figure 3 (51-81)

White met Black's approach at 52, forced with White 54 and 56, then defended at 60. I should have played Black 55 at 56, both for better eye shape and to leave White fewer forcing moves.



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

Kobayashi may have worked out the whole sequence from White 52 to 60 and decided that it was par for the course, but White might have done better to defend at 1 in Dia. 12. Suppose White continues through 7. The difference between this result and the actual game is White 'a' and Black 'b', closing the corner versus extending on the side. In this

position, extending on the side looks a little bigger. When I sealed Black 61 to end the first day, I thought I had recovered from my bad start.

Someone's theory was to play Black 61 at A, but that wouldn't have occurred to me. Another question is whether White could have played 60 at 1 in Dia. 13. Black will immediately invade at 2. White can't get much of a double attack going against this and the black group in the upper right, or the two black stones on the left side. He doesn't have an attacking shape.

I thought I had evened the game up, but White 66 was a logical and excellent move. White doesn't want to play the hane at B and extend, and jumping to White C would leave trouble in the corner.




Dia. 14

Needless to say, White was anticipating the attachment at 1 in Dia. 14. If Black plays 'a', then White plays 'b', so Black plays 2 instead, but he gets overrun through White 11, even losing Black 'c'—White 'd'.

With Black 67, we started quietly trading big moves and key points. Defending at Black 73 was urgent. Black played 75 and 77 in sequence, and now we come to the position after White 80. Surrounding territory with Black 81 was a slip due to awareness of having caught up. White immediately forced at D.

The crucial point that Black had to take was 1 in Dia. 15. You can't expect to win if you miss a move like this. White 2 to 6 aren't much of a reduction, and once Black strengthens his

group with 1, he can easily play moves like Black 'a'–White 'b'–Black 'c'. After Black 'c', there's the hane at 'd'.



Dia. 15

As you'll see in the next figure, Black proceeded to walk right into a white attack. If I hadn't thought that I had caught up, if I had thought I was still behind, I would have had no trouble choosing the sequence in *Dia. 15*.

Figure 4 (82–115). An unexpected wedge

No sooner had I surrounded territory than White let fly with the clever attachment at 82. If Black defends at 88, White plays 84, and if Black resists with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 16*, he just helps White to get going. The point is that if White becomes strong in this area, the attack at White 'a' becomes more threatening.

Since I had no good reply, I probed at Black 83, which is 'b' in *Dia. 16*. If White takes at 'c', then Black 'd' forces White 'e', which should help out in the center. If White plays 'e' at 'f', he's in a precarious position, because Black 'g'–White 'h'–Black 'i' destroys his eyes.

So we each went our own way and a minor exchange took place, but I don't think that Black profited. During this sequence, I played Black 89 on the upper side because I could see the attack coming. This forcing move would probably not have turned out well if answered by White A–Black B–White 92, instead of White 90.

Black 91, defending the lower side, was playing the position for all it was worth.

White had built up strength with 90, so it was obvious that he would come cutting at 92 and 94. Black had no choice but to invite this attack.





Figure 4 (82–115)




Dia. 16


Someone commented that White should have traded White C for Black D before starting to attack. The way the game proceeded made this obviously true, but it's also obvious that after White C–Black D, Black would play differently in the center, because White C involves a local loss.

There should be no argument about the defensive contact move at 99. White 1 in *Dia. 17* doesn't turn out well. Black 8 and 10 create a ko, and Black has a ko threat at 'a'.

The two big groups sprawled over the center were both alive. The question was how the black group including 109 was going to survive and what would happen in the process. I didn't have good premonitions about this. White had been leading all through this figure, and I was running out of time.




Dia. 17



Dia. 18

White 112 and 114 surprised me. White seemed to be looking for a move that would wrap up the game, but there was no reason for him to fill in liberties with White 112–Black 113. I expected White just to extend at 1 in Dia. 18. This makes a big difference if Black answers at 'a', then plunges in at 'b' (White 'c'–Black 'd'–White 'e'). I might have ended up playing Black 'a' anyway, as in the game, but my intention was to answer at Black 2. That loses, since White's huge group is alive.

Following Dia. 18, Black pushes out and cuts in Dia. 19, but can't get a good result. For that matter, if Black thinks better of it and plays 2 at 'a' in Dia. 18, he probably loses anyway.



Dia. 19

13: connects

Figure 5 (116–146). White's two losing moves

During the next 20 moves there are too many variations to cover completely, so I'll stick to the main points. I naturally expected White 18 and 20, but not White 22. That was completely unanticipated. It was a hundred-percent move. White was trying for everything, but in fact he was allowing Black to play 23. White 22 in this figure and 112 in the previous figure seem to have been the game-losing moves.





Figure 5 (116–146)


What I feared most was that White would push at 1 in Dia. 20. When Black captures at 2, White takes control at 3. Black lives with 4, and White plays 5. Can those three black stones survive? If White can capture them he wins, despite the damage at the top. It's diffi-

cult, but I think Black dies, even if he peeps at 'a' before playing 4. Considering this, I now think I should have played Black 21 at 31, although it's not clear where that will lead.



Dia. 20

Kobayashi said he connected at 22 because he had read out the variations in which White answers Black 2 at 3 Dia. 21, and had decided that they wouldn't work. He was right. Black plays 8 to 18, and the situation is out of White's control.



Dia. 21

After this, I played carefully, because I sensed that Black had gone into the lead. When I captured with Black 45 I was inwardly certain of victory, but had it not been for those two white moves, I would surely have lost--

and if I had lost, there's no telling what would have happened in the seventh game.




Figure 6 (147-232) 132: at 123

Figure 6 (147-232)

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Abridged from Kido, January 1998)

(Games One to Six translated by James Davies.)




The remains of the day.
How Cho releases nervous tension.

Pyramid Power in Handicap Openings

by Koyama Shizuo 6-dan

Finding the best move in the opening can often be perplexing. Here is a method that can help you quickly spot the best move in many situations.




Dia. 1


In the five-stone handicap game in *Dia. 1*, White maps out a modest sphere of influence at the top with the moves from 1 to 5. White often makes this formation in handicap games. The problem is where should Black play next.

Black 6 is a good counter to White's formation. Black's formation at the bottom is like a great pyramid covering a quarter of the board, while White's is just a small burial mound. In the race for influence and territory, this move keeps Black well ahead.

The game continues with White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*. White 3 strikes at the weak underbelly of Black's two stones in the upper right, so you may feel an urge to defend there, but doing so is not urgent. The balance of forces there is still even — two black stones to two white ones — and White's stones on the right side are over-extended. It is more interesting for Black to continue his pyramid strategy and play 4 on the left side. Now an even greater pyramid is taking shape, the base of which extends diagonally from the handicap stone in the upper left to the handicap stone in the lower right.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Black's pyramid is accumulating great power, so White must try to diminish it by establishing a presence of his own. He invades with 1 in *Dia. 3* and the joseki to White 5 follows. Black must press his advantage by attacking the white stones, but where and, more importantly, from which direction?




Dia. 4

Black attacks on a grand scale with 1 in *Dia. 4*. This move reinforces the pyramidal shape he constructed in *Dia. 1*, the base of which is now anchored by two additional stones. Note that Black 1 is played some distance from the three white stones on the left; this makes it harder for White to break into Black's moyo on the right.




Dia. 6

Locally, Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6* are good moves, but in this position they are in the wrong direction. White jumps to 4, wiping out Black's pyramid at the bottom. After 5, Black is left with a shallow triangle of influence in the upper left. Next, White invades with 6 and there is the potential for fierce fighting to break out in the lower left sector. Compared to *Dia. 5*, this is not a very good result for Black.




Dia. 5

Jumping out to White 2 in *Dia. 5* is the natural move, but Black reinforces the left-side wall of his pyramid by pushing up with 3. White jumps out to 4, inducing Black to defend the upper left side with 5. After White exchanges 6 for 7, Black's sphere of influence in the bottom left has almost become secure territory. Moreover, White's stones on the left are still thin and he must worry about the peep of Black 'a'.




Dia. 7

In the three-stone handicap game in *Dia. 7*, a joseki has been played out in the upper left with the sequence to Black 7. Black has mapped out the start of a large pyramid along the lines A, B, and C. How should White play to break up this formation?



Dia. 8

By playing the approach move of 1 in *Dia. 8*, White hopes to break up Black's triangular formation shown in *Dia. 7*. If Black obediently responds with the joseki moves of 2 and 4, White extends to 5 and Black's triangular sphere of influence has vanished. By playing 4, Black loses the initiative.




Dia. 9


Black should have pincerd at 1 in *Dia. 9* instead of defending the corner with 4 in *Dia. 8*. The joseki to Black 7 could be expected. Black's large-scale triangular formation is not only preserved but even strengthened.

If White is intent on preventing a large-scale triangular formation, playing on the central point of 1 in *Dia. 10* is the sure way to do so. If Black makes a checking extension to 2, White extends to 3 and is satisfied to have

reduced the scale of Black's triangle, indicated by the dotted line, to manageable proportions.




Dia. 10



Dia. 11

When you embark on a triangular strategy, you must think about it from the very first moves of the opening and be determined not to slavishly follow josekis, as with Black 4 in *Dia. 8*. After White draws back to 4 in *Dia. 7*, Black's triangle extends along the lines A, B, and C. This is when Black must anticipate White 1 in *Dia. 10* and occupy the central point on the right side himself with 1 in *Dia. 11* instead of following the joseki by connecting at 2. Even if White cuts with 2, Black can take another big point at the bottom with 3. Now he has a triangular formation in the lower right half of the board anchored with stones at 1 and 3.




Dia. 12

After Black 1 in *Dia. 12*, White attempts to disrupt Black's triangle with 2 and 4 at the bottom. Black can now go back and finish the joseki in the upper left with 5 and 7. Black's triangular formation is on the same scale as in *Dia. 9*.

In *Dia. 13*, Black makes a low approach move with 1. White pincers with 2 and Black

counterpincers with 3. After the exchange of White 4 for Black 5, White attaches with 6, expecting to engage Black in a fight, but Black deftly switches to the bottom and takes a big point with 7, leaving his stone at the top as aji and anchoring his triangular formation, which stretches from Black 3 in the upper left side to the handicap stone in the lower right.



Dia. 13

The Cover Motoharu and the Severed Head

by William Pinckard

This oban print by Yoshitoshi is from a series titled *Eimei Niju-hachi Shoku* ('28 Famous Poems'). The inscription in the upper left part of this design tells an interesting ghost story, which we give in summary:

It seems that Yurugi Motoharu, governor of the fief of Tamba, a region near Osaka, was not only accomplished in swordsmanship and literature but was also extremely fond of go. Hearing that a certain blind monk in his domain was a skillful player, Motoharu invited him to have a game. The monk played well but tactlessly, even jeering at some of Motoharu's moves. The result was that the young lord lost his temper, drew his sword, and

decapitated the monk with one blow — 'thus,' as the text says, punning on technical go terms, 'finding the "vital spot" with a move that proved more decisive than all the "kos" and "ladders" which the other had been able to think up, so that even though his stones had "eyes", the eyeless monk lost the game.'


After this, the monk's ghost began to make a nuisance of itself by poking its head over the garden wall and whining 'How about another game? Just one more game?' Finally, one of Motoharu's retainers arranged for a solemn burial service for the monk. His spirit was placated by this, and the ghost appeared no more.

Endgame Problems on 5x5 boards (1)


by Fukui Masaaki 8-dan

Studying the endgame on the standard 19x19 board can be quite exhausting and involve complicated calculations as well as figuring out difficult sente-gote relationships. This is one reason why many amateurs do not devote as much time to the endgame as they should. On smaller boards, however, endgame study becomes more manageable. I believe that the ideal way for players to begin their study of the endgame is to start on a 5x5 board. The board is small enough so that all you have to do is to find the key move that wins.


To this end I have composed a number of endgame problems for this size board, the first twelve are given in this instalment. Regard these problems as compositions that illustrate an endgame technique. They are not the result of actual play. In all problems, Black plays first and he must win by one point or more. A draw is considered a failure. Answers begin on the next page.




Problem 1




Problem 2




Problem 3




Problem 4




Problem 5




Problem 6




Problem 7




Problem 8




Problem 9



Problem 10




Problem 11




Problem 12

Answers to Endgame Problems




Problem 1
Failure

The sequence from Black 1 to 5 ends in a draw.




Problem 1
Black wins by one point.

Black 1 reduces White's territory by one point, but Black still gets six points, as in the failure diagram.




Problem 2
Failure

Black 1 is the correct first move, but Black 3 results in a draw. If Black 3 at 6, White wins by one point after White 4-Black 3-White 5.




Problem 2
Black wins by one point.

When White connects at 2, Black 3 is the correct move. After Black 5, the game is over. It doesn't matter which side plays on the point 'a'.




Problem 3
Failure 1

If Black 1, White plays 2. Black 3 is ineffective: the result is a draw. If Black 1 at 3, White 2 still results in a draw.




Problem 3
White is crushed.

Black 1 is the vital point. If White 2, Black 3 creates a ko. Black 5 is the only ko threat. White can't connect at 1, so White's stones die.




Problem 3
Black wins by three points.
10: passes; 11: connects at 6

White 2 is the only feasible response to Black 1, but, since White has no ko threats, he can't fight a ko by throwing in at 5 and must connect at 4. After Black 5, the white group is alive, but in seki. After Black 9, there are no more ko threats.




Problem 4
Failure

Black 1 is the correct move, but Black 3 is a mistake. White 4 and 6 result in a seki. If Black 5 at 'a', White will play at 5 and Black has no ko threats to fight the ko. If Black 1 at 3, White 2 at 1 forces Black to connect at 'a', resulting in a draw.




Problem 4
Black wins by one point.

After the exchange of Black 1 for White 2, Black should fall back to 3, which ensures him of a one-point win. When White fills the liberty at 'a', Black need not answer.




Problem 5
Failure

Black 1 is a naive move. The game is over and the result is a draw.




Problem 5
Black wins by two points.

Black plays 1 and sacrifices this stone with the sequence to 5. After White 6 (played at 1), Black wins by two points. If White plays 2 at either 3 or 5, Black plays 'a' and the result is a seki.




Problem 6
Failure

If Black plays 1 and 3, the result after the exchange of White 4 for Black 5 is a draw.




Problem 6
Black wins by one point.

The correct sequence is to play 3 and 5. Black 7 is a skillful move. If Black 7 at 'a', the sequence White 'b'–Black 7–White 'c' results in a seki. After 7, White gains nothing by capturing at 'a'.




Problem 7
Failure

The sequence to White 6 results in a seki, so White wins by five points.




Problem 7
Black wins by one point.

Black 3 is the move that enables Black to win. If White fills the liberty at 'a', Black doesn't have to answer and can pass.




Problem 8
Failure

Linking up with Black 1 obviously results in a draw.




Problem 8
Black wins by one point.

Black 1 is a brilliant tesuji. White captures two stones with 4, but Black retakes with 5 (above 4). Finally, White must make two eyes with 6, but he only gets three points to Black's four.



Problem 9
Failure


Black 1 is the correct move, but Black 3 fails to get the extra winning point. White hanes at 4 and the result is a draw.



Problem 9

Black wins by one point.


After 1, Black must descend to 3. If White throws in a stone at 5, Black gains a point by capturing it. Either way, Black wins.



Problem 10

Failure


Black 1 is the obvious endgame move, but the result is a draw. Black can do better than this.



Problem 10

Black wins by one point.


Black 1 is a sharp endgame tesuji. If White plays any move except 2, his stones die. Next, Black 3 and 5 leave White with only three points to Black's four.



Problem 11

Failure


Black 1 is greedy. White throws in a stone at 2. Black defends at 3, but White 4 kills the black stones. If Black 1 at 'a', the result will be a draw.



Problem 11

Black wins by two points.


Quietly connecting at Black 1 is the correct move. Next, Black descends to 3 and wins by two points.



Problem 12

Failure

Black 1 is an overplay. Up to White 6, the position for both sides is seki, so each gets zero points.



Problem 12

Black wins by six points.

Black 1 is the vital point. White must play 2 and 4 to get a seki — if he neglects to play 4, he dies — so Black gets sente to make two eyes and six points at the top. Next, White can't start a ko because there are no ko threats.

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'The speed and forcefulness of Shusaku's play with black are like lightning striking the go board; his skill at finishing off his opponent once he took the lead is unrivaled.' — Hayashi Yutaka, go historian

'Shusaku would read out all the possible variations, then play straightforwardly, making the simplest move, if he thought it ensured a win. This way of playing is only possible if one has a clear understanding of the principles of go and is blessed with superb positional judgment, and it also requires considerable self-confidence. On those rare occasions when he got into a bad position, he would display tremendous strength in fighting his way back into the lead. The castle game with Ito Showa in 1850 is a good example of a game in which he reveals his latent strength . . . Another feature of his go is his flexibility and willingness to experiment. Modern go is still far from surpassing Shusaku.' — Ishida Yoshio, former Meijin, Honinbo

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
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Ladder and Net Problems


Ladders and nets are the two most basic capturing techniques. A player who is around 20-kyu should understand and be able to spot situations in his games in which these techniques can be applied. In actual practice, however, even shodans will make mistakes in using these techniques. To give you practice in being able to find ladders and nets which may lay hidden in the complexities of a game position, here are fifteen problems.

Problem 1




The joseki in the upper right corner ends when Black plays 9, capturing a stone in a ladder. What should White do next?

Problem 2




White plays 1, expecting to capture a stone in a ladder. Look at the marked stone in the upper left corner. Will this stone block the ladder?

Problem 3




Here is a simple problem to start off our net problems. The sequence to Black 12 is a joseki. What should Black do after White cuts at 13? Assume that all ladders are unfavorable for Black.

Problem 4




Black to capture the two white stones in the center. Assume that all ladders are unfavorable for Black.

Problem 5




Black to capture the three marked stones. Assume that all ladders are unfavorable for Black.

Problem 6




White 5 is a bad move; cutting at 7 instead is the joseki. After White blocks with 11, how can Black best utilize his two stones at 4 and 10? Assume that all ladders are unfavorable for Black.

Problem 7




This time White blocks on the inside with 10. Can Black save his two stones on the right? Assume that all ladders are favorable for Black.

Problem 8




Can White utilize the cut at A to save his marked stone by extending to 1? Assume that all ladders are unfavorable for Black.

Problem 9




Black to capture the three marked stones. Assume that all ladders are favorable for Black.

Problem 10




How can Black save his marked stones at the top?

Problem 11




After White extends to 1, how can Black capture the two white stones?

Problem 12




White ataris with 1. Can Black stop him from saving his marked stones?

Problem 13




How can Black save his four stones on the left?

Problem 14




How can Black save his six stones on the left?

Problem 15



How can Black save his seven stones at the top?


Answers to Ladder and Net Problems



Problem 1. Correct Answer

Problem 1. Correct Answer

The shoulder hit at White 1 blocks the ladder. If Black captures with 2, White plays 3, breaking up Black's formation at the bottom. This is an enormous setback for Black.




Dia. 1

Dia.1. If Black defends

If Black defends the bottom by playing 2 at 3 in the correct answer (the marked black stone here), the ladder doesn't work and White can escape by extending to 1. The sequence to White 35 shows how the ladder fails: White 35 and the marked white stone put the stone at 32 into atari. If Black connects at 36 White has numerous double ataris, such as 37, and he can flow through Black's stones like water going through a sieve.

Problem 2. Correct Answer


White 1 succeeds in capturing Black in a ladder as the sequence to 36 shows. When White ataris with 35, Black finds his stones short of liberties. Even if he connects at 36, he is still in atari and White can capture at A. You should carefully compare this ladder with the one in *Problem 1* and understand why the marked stone here failed to block the ladder, while the marked stone in *Dia. 1* of *Problem 1* succeeded.



Problem 2. Correct Answer

Problem 3. Correct Answer


Black should extend to 1. White must defend with 2 because if Black plays here, White will lose three stones. Finally, Black captures the white stone by casting a net with 3.




Problem 3. Correct Answer

Problem 4. Correct Answer

Jumping ahead of the white stones with 1 seals their fate. Trying to escape with White 2 and 4 in *Dia. 1* fails when Black ataris with 5.




Problem 4. Correct Answer




Dia. 1

Problem 5. Correct Answer

Only the knight's move of Black 1 succeeds in capturing the white stones. If White ataris with 2, Black connects with 3 and this is the same pattern as we saw in *Problem 4*. White can't avoid capture.



Problem 5. Correct Answer




Dia. 1


What about Black 1 in *Dia. 1*? White ataris with 2 and, after Black connects with 3, White is out in the open with 4.

Problem 6. Correct Answer

Black ataris with 1, 3, and 5, then extends to 7, threatening to capture the two marked stones. White must play 8. Next —




Problem 6. Correct Answer



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Continuation

Black casts a net with 9 and White must capture with 10 and 12. Black's thickness in the center is overwhelming and more than compensates for the meager territory White has gotten in the corner. Black can now play elsewhere and need not worry about connecting at A.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black makes a thick wall.

If White does play at 1, Black will atari with 2 and connect on the outside with 4. If White persists and goes after the two black stones with 5, Black will sacrifice them and atari with 6. After 8, Black's thick wall influences the whole board.

Problem 7. Correct Answer: turning


Black should turn at 1. If White extends to 2, Black ataris with 3 and plays 5. He can now save his three stones on the right with a ladder at A or one at B.




Problem 7. Correct Answer

Problem 8. Correct Answer: a net

Casting a net with Black 1 works in spite of the atari of White 2. Black connects at 3 and when White ataris at 4, Black also ataris with 5, squeezing the three white stones. After White captures with 6 —




Problem 8. Correct Answer



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Continuation

Black ataris with 7. If White connects at 8, Black 9 captures the white stones.




Dia. 2


The position in the problem arose from the invasion joseki in *Dia. 2*.

Problem 9. Correct Answer

Black ataris with 1, 3, and 5. It seems as if the ladder doesn't work because White 4 puts Black 1 into atari. White resists 6 and 8 before capturing with 10. Next —



Problem 9. Correct Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1 Continuation


Black ataris with 11 and White connects at 12, but another ladder comes into being with Black 13, 15, and 17, so the white stones are captured.

Problem 10. Correct Answer

Casting a net with Black 1 captures three white stones. If White resists with 2, connecting at 3 is the tesuji. If White tries to break out with the atari of 4, Black ataris with 5. After White captures with 6 —



Problem 10. Correct Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Continuation


Black ataris again with 7 and 9 and White finds his stones caught in a ladder when Black plays 11.

Problem 11. Correct Answer

This problem takes a bit of reading, but it should be obvious to you by now that Black must cast a net with 1. If White tries to escape with 2, Black plays 3, increasing the liberties of his stones on the right and keeping White limited to two liberties. Next —



Problem 11. Correct Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Continuation

If White persists in escaping with 4 and the following, Black pursues him with the sequence to 13, restricting him to two liberties and driving him to the edge of the board where he finally runs out of liberties.

Problem 12. Correct Answer

Black 1 ataris all the white stones at the top. If White captures with 2, Black ataris again with 3. Next —



Problem 12


Dia. 1. Continuation

White connects at 4, but he is caught in a ladder when Black ataris with 5.

Dia. 2. Variation


After Black 1 in the correct answer, White might try to run away on the other side with

4. But when Black ataris with 9, it becomes obvious that this other ladder misses the marked white stone, so White captures with 10. But after Black ataris with 11, the situation is the same as in *Dia. 1* and White loses his stones.



Problem 13. Correct Answer

The ataris of Black 1 and 3 are the tesujis. If White captures with 4 —




Dia. 1. Continuation

Black ataris with 5, then catches White in a ladder with the sequence to 13.

Problem 14. Correct Answer

Attaching at Black 1 is the tesuji. If White connects with 2, Black plays 3 and 5. After White captures with 6 —




Dia. 1. Continuation

Black ataris with 7, then catches ten white stones with the atari of 9.

Problem 15. Correct Answer

The atari of Black 1 is the first key move. White defends the two stones by connecting with 2. White then ataris with 3 and casts a net with 5. This is the second key move. White tries to escape with 6, but Black pursues him with 7 and 9. Black must be careful in his response to White 10.




Dia. 1. Continuation

Black must turn at 11. This is the third key move. After Black 15, there is no escape for the white stones and Black's stones at the top are safe. Note the role that the marked stone played in this capturing race.

Dia. 2. Failure 1

If Black had not exchanged A for White B in *Dia. 1*, after Black 5 (15 in *Dia. 1*), White could atari with 6 and capture five black stones.



Dia. 3. Failure 2


If Black plays 11 here instead of 11 in *Dia. 1*, Black would have to capture with 13 and White could escape with 14.

An Introduction to Basic Josekis (1)

This series is aimed at players around 20-kyu and is intended to give them an understanding of the most commonly played josekis and how they are applied in the fuseki. Each move in the joseki is analyzed and the reason it is played is completely explained.


Dia. 1. The basic joseki

The joseki to White 8 is one of the most commonly played. Black secures territory in the corner, while White establishes a position on the side. Playing White 8 on the fourth line or on the third line at A depends on the placement of stones in other parts of the board. Let's consider the reason for each move.



Dia. 2. Avoiding a non-existent risk

After White approaches with the marked stone, a timid player might be afraid to attach at 3 in Dia. 1, thinking that it is better to avoid any risk by simply defending the corner with the diagonal move of 1, then extending to 3. However, Black does not get as much territory as he does in Dia. 1. We will show that attaching with Black 3 involves no risk.



Dia. 3. A frightening move?

After Black plays the marked stone, the hane of White 1 is probably a frightening move for a novice. Cutting with Black 2 is the only move. It is now three black stones against two white ones, so White is outnumbered and Black will come out of any fighting that follows with an advantage. For example —


Dia. 4. Trying to live in the corner

White ataris with 1 and blocks with 3. After Black turns with 4, White connects at 5 and Black must save his three stones at the top by

extending to 6. Next, White jumps to 7, threatening to live in the corner.

Dia. 5. Sacrificing two stones

White has no chance of living. Black cuts through with 8 and 10. Sacrificing two stones by descending to 12 is the key move. After White captures with 15 —




Dia. 6. White dies.

Black throws in a stone with 16. It is clear that White is dead after Black blocks at 18.


Dia. 7. Living in the corner

After Black cuts with the marked stone, White can live in the corner by playing the sequence from 1 to 9. Black 8 is the key move because it enables Black to perfectly capture the cutting stone by casting a net with 10. Black's thickness in the center is far better than White's small profit. If Black made a diagonal connection at A with 8, he would leave behind weaknesses that White could later exploit, even if the ladder at B were favorable for him.



Dia. 8 Variation

In answer to White 1, Black could descend to 2. After White 3 and 5, Black will capture the cutting stone with 6. Again, Black is thick in the center and White gets small profit in the corner. If you have studied the preceding article on ladders and nets you should see instantly that White A is answered by Black B.



Dia. 9


Dia. 9. Another joseki

White 2 leads to another joseki. Black 3 is the only response. After White 4, Black has a lot of choices. Most of them will lead to complicated variations, but if you simply connect at 5, you won't go wrong. After the exchange of 6 for 7, Black gets the corner, while White gets influence in the center. Next, White can continue with either A or B.


Dia. 10. Black can't cut.

Apart from White 2 in *Dia. 9*, blocking with White 2 is the only joseki move. Can Black cut at 3?

No, he can't. If he does, White takes control of the corner with the sequence to 8.




Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Dia. 11. Four choices

The only reasonable move for Black is to defend his corner territory by drawing back to 1. White now has three choices: to connect tightly at A, make a diagonal connection at B, or jump lightly to C. Actually, White has a fourth choice: he can play elsewhere. (For an example, see *Dia. 11* on page 37.)




Dia. 12

Dia. 12. Connecting tightly

Connecting tightly with White 1 is the usual move, against which Black answers at 2. White 3 or White A completes the joseki. Depending on the position on the right side, Black could also play 2 at B. Can Black afford to omit the move at 2?


Dia. 13. An alternative strategy

If Black has enclosed the corner in the upper left, the checking extension of Black 1 would be a possible strategy. However, White will press Black into a low position along the right side with the attachment of 2 and make thickness in the center with the sequence to 8. Whether or not this is a good strategy depends on the overall position and how skillful Black is in neutralizing White's thickness and defending his own influence at the top.



Dia. 13


Applications



Dia. 14

Dia. 14. An important decision


When completing this joseki, White must decide whether to play 8 in *Dia. 1* on the fourth line or on the third line at A. In general, if White has a stone in the upper left corner, playing 1 on the fourth line as in this diagram will never be a bad move. If Black approaches at 2 —



Dia. 15

Dia. 15. A well-positioned stone


White can pincer at 3. The sequence to White 9 is often played in professional games. The marked white stone is now well positioned and works effectively with White's wall in the top left.



Dia. 16

Dia. 16. Capping moves


If White had played the marked stone on the third line, Black could cap at 1, blocking the expansion of White's territorial framework. White could counterpincer at A, but this would be a risky strategy.



Dia. 17

Dia. 17. Extending along the third line


If Black had a strong position in the top left as here, then White would want to extend along the third line with 1. If Black makes a checking extension to 2, jumping to White 3 is the standard response, although White may not make this move immediately. If Black neglects to play 2, White will look for a chance to extend to A.



Dia. 18

Dia. 18. A severe checking extension


If White were to play 1 on the fourth line, the checking extension of Black 2, aiming at an invasion at A, would be severe because it would be too slow for White to defend at B.



Dia. 19

Dia. 19. Both a pincer and an extension

Considering the marked black and white stones in the upper left corner, the diagonal connection of White 1 (White B in Dia. 11) is the appropriate move here. After Black defends at 2, White can extend as far as 3, so this move becomes a pincer against the marked black stone as well as an extension from 1.



Dia. 20

4: elsewhere

Dia. 20. Too many moves at the top

White 1 and 3 here are too slow. Since White 3 doesn't attack the marked black stone (it still has room to extend along the top), Black will play elsewhere. White needs another move to subdue it, but if he plays 5, White will treat it lightly and quickly establish a position on the left with 6 and 8. White has invested too many stones at the top while Black has been playing all over the board. Black can still run away A, so White still hasn't settled the top.


The Niren-sei Opening

by Michael Redmond 8-dan

In January 1997, Michael Redmond gave a brilliant analysis of current professional thinking about the niren-sei opening. He was actually doing a live commentary on satellite TV; so few moves had been played that Michael decided to give a fuseki lecture to fill in the time.

We managed to obtain a videotaped copy of his lecture and got his permission to translate it for our readers. He was also kind enough to check it and add a number of diagrams to clarify points that he glossed over in the TV presentation.


For readers interested in studying the game, a commentary on it can be found in *Go World* 79. The first 24 moves are shown in the figure below.



21st Kisei Title Match, Game Two (1-24)
White: Cho Chikun; Black: Kobayashi Satoru


In this game, both Cho and Kobayashi made the niren-sei pattern. This is one of the most popular opening patterns in modern go and the strategies inherent in it are applicable not only in even games but also in handicap games. The editor of *Go World* feels that this is a thorough and easy-to-understand treatment of this opening pattern and it should be essential reading for all kyu-players who are striving to make shodan.

The pattern arising when one side occupies two adjacent corner star points is called *niren-sei*. In *Dia. 1*, Black 1-3 and White 2-4 are *niren-sei* patterns. Recently, the *niren-sei* has become the most popular opening played among Chinese, Japanese, and Korean pros.



Dia. 1


After Black has made the *niren-sei* formation, if he is intent on making a large-scale territorial framework, he can take the central star point on the side with 5 as in *Dia. 2*. This opening pattern, called *sanren-sei* (three star points in a row), is a favorite of Takemiya Masaki 9-dan. Against White 6, he often answers with 7 and uses this move to build a moyo on the right. (See Games Two, Four and Six of the 1996 Meijin title match in *Go World* 78 and 79.)



Dia. 2


Instead of 7, Black could also occupy another star point at the bottom and make a *yonren-sei* (four star points in a row).

After White 4 in *Dia. 1*, an approach move at Black 1 in *Dia. 3* is the usual continuation if Black doesn't make a sanren-sei. White must decide whether to pincer at A or to simply stake out territory on the left with B or C.



Dia. 3


If White pincers at 2 in *Dia. 4*, Black will jump to 3. The joseki to Black 13 has recently become fashionable. White 14 is the perfect point: it drives a wedge into Black's two star-point stones, so the wall Black has made up to 13 is not very effective.



Dia. 4


In response to White 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black could attack at 2. White has to save his stones at the bottom, so he breaks through Black's thin position on the left with the sequence to

7. Black is too weak to fight back, so he should just atari with 4 and make a thick wall by connecting at 6. White seems to have taken a lot of territory, but Black can still invade at A.




Dia. 5

Peeping at Black 1, then connecting at 3 in *Dia. 6* is another alternative. If White settles his stones at the bottom right with 4, Black 5 is now sente. If White captures the single stone, Black makes a central moyo with the sequence to 11.




Dia. 6

After Black 5 in *Dia. 6*, White could move out into the center with 1 in *Dia. 7*. Black will answer once at 2, threatening 3 next. It now becomes clear that forcing the exchange of the marked black stone for the marked white one was well-timed. If Black were to play it later, White would answer at A, forcing Black B, and take sente. This result is similar to *Dia. 6*. Playing Black 6 at 7, to rob White of his eyes, is also possible.



Dia. 7

In the game, White defended the left side with 2 in *Dia. 8*. Black's usual response is A, B, or C. He would never play D after exchanging 1 for 2 because White would pincer at B and the stone at Black 1 would be outnumbered three to one; Black could easily find himself in trouble around here.




Dia. 8


The sequence to Black 5 in *Dia. 9* is an old joseki, but it is still played today.

After Black 3 in *Dia. 9*, there is no guarantee that White will follow the joseki there. He might approach with 4 in *Dia. 10*, then pincer with 6. Black will have to settle his stones by playing 7 and White will block his access to the center with 8. Before playing 8, White can also exchange A for Black B. If Black finds this

result disagreeable, he should not slide to 3 but immediately extend to C.




Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Black 3 in *Dia. 11* is the third alternative. This is also a good move, but there is a danger of White's invading at A or attaching at B. The advantage of playing 3 at C is that Black's stones are settled.




Dia. 11

After Black extends to the marked stone (or to A) in *Dia. 12* (next page), he must consider what to do if White approaches at 1. The pincer at 2 is in the right direction. If White jumps to 3, the joseki to Black 12 can be expected. White is too thin to invade the bottom, so the territory at the bottom and on the right can be considered to be Black's. White gets influence in the center, but his prospects for developing a moyo there are not very promising.




Dia. 12

Since White 3 in *Dia. 12* does not give White a good result, what can he expect if he invades at 3 in *Dia. 13*? Black has two choices: A and B. If he blocks at A he will end in sente. If he blocks at B, he gets a large-scale moyo, but he ends in gote.




Dia. 13

In *Dia. 14*, Black blocks at 4 and White ends in gote with the joseki to 11. Black then makes an approach move at 12. Black is playing a fast-paced opening and he has territory in the bottom left and influence up and down the right side. He has also managed to play approach moves against both of White's stones on the star points. White would not be very happy with this result.



Dia. 14


If Black wanted to make a moyo, he would block with 4 in *Dia. 15*. White lives in the corner, but Black gets influence in the center. This result would be especially good if the marked stone were at A. In this position, however, this strategy is dubious because White could make a shoulder hit at A, wiping out Black's moyo.



Dia. 15


Approaching Black's stone in the lower right corner doesn't lead to very interesting results for White, so he approaches with 1 at the top right in *Dia. 16*, then extends to 3, expanding his influence. Moreover, the marked white stone and 3 give White a high posture in preparation for building a moyo. White 3 at A is possible, but it would not be

interesting, as the shape would be identical to Black's. White is trying to counter Black's stance by taking the high ground and making a larger moyo. The drawback to White 3 is that it leaves open an invasion at Black B.



Dia. 16


When White plays 3 in *Dia. 16*, he envisages making a moyo at the top by adding the marked stones in *Dia. 17*. It may be overly optimistic for White to expect to play all these moves, but even if he gets to play some of them, he can consider his strategy a success.




Dia. 17

Black is now faced with the problem of how to enter the left side. Black 1 in *Dia. 18* is a flexible move because he has the option of settling this stone by extending to either A or B. That is, if White plays C, White will extend to A; if White D, Black B.

The approach move of Black 1 in *Dia. 19* is not good; Black is expecting too much. But if White submissively answers with 2 and continues with the joseki to 5, Black will be overjoyed with this result. He is now threatening to take another good point by extending to A.




Dia. 18




Dia. 19

In answer to Black 1, White must pincer with 2 in *Dia. 20*. This is a severe move. Black must jump to 3 and, after White defends the top with 4, jump to 5 (or A). White defends the left side with 6, and the three black stones are floating in the center.



Dia. 20




Dia. 21

After White answers with 4 in *Dia. 21*, Black might pincer with 5, but White will jump to 6 and Black is left with two weak groups. This is a completely unacceptable result for Black.


What about invading the corner with 3 in *Dia. 22* (next page)? If White blocks with 4, the joseki to Black 11 will follow. But now the two marked white stones have become thin. White reaches out to them with 12, expanding his influence in the center, but Black makes a

shoulder hit at 13 and White's moyo is wiped out and he has almost no territory. Black, with his profit in the upper left, the upper right, and the bottom left, has taken the lead. Black could also play 13 at A.




Dia. 22

When Black invades with 3, White 4 in *Dia. 23* is the correct direction in which to block. The joseki to 8 follows and White has made an ideal moyo at the top. Moreover, Black is confined to the corner and White's stones at 2 and 8 work well with his marked stone below.




Dia. 23

For the above reasons, an approach move should not be made in this position. The correct strategy is to break up the left side with Black 1 in *Dia. 18*.



Dia. 24


Of White's two options, let's first look at White 1 in *Dia. 24*. This move follows the principle of driving your opponent's stones towards your strong stones. Black extends to 2 and White exchanges 3 for Black 4 before defending with 5. The 3-4 exchange is important because it prevents Black from sliding to A and makes the extension to the marked stone too narrow. Next, White aims to attack at B or C.



Dia. 25

Black 1 in *Dia. 25* is an important move for two reasons. First, it prevents White from attacking at this point and makes the black stones nearly impregnable. Second, once Black has secured these stones, White is faced with the problem of how to defend his three


weaknesses at A, B, and C. Let's see what would happen if Black were to play on these points.



Dia. 26


If Black invades at 1 in *Dia. 26*, White must attach at 2. The sequence to Black 9 will follow and White's potential territory at the top has been destroyed.

Black could also invade at 1 in *Dia. 27*. Again White attaches with 2 and what was once White's territory has become Black's with the sequence to Black 9.




Dia. 27

Invading the corner with 1 at the 3-3 point in *Dia. 28* is more subtle. If White answers with 2, Black will regard his move as a probe and play elsewhere. Later, he can come back and continue with A or B.




Dia. 28




Dia. 29

If White descends to 2 in *Dia. 29*, Black can live in the corner in sente with the sequence to 11. However, there are two drawbacks to this invasion. First, White 2 weakens the black stones on the left side. Second, White secures territory at the top. For these reasons, the timing of this invasion is important.



Dia. 30


For example, if White were to strengthen his stones at the top with a move around A in *Dia. 30*, then an invasion at B would be appropriate. But if White defended the corner with C, then Black D would become urgent.



Dia. 31

Dia. 31 gives a few other defense-and-attack combinations. If White A, Black B; if White C, Black D (with an extra white stone at C, F would be too deep an invasion). If Black has already played a stone at E, then he can invade at F. In addition, the invasion of Black G at the 3-3 point still remains.


As these examples show, White is in bit of a quandary as to how to defend the top.




Dia. 32

All the invasions in the preceding diagrams become feasible only after Black has played 1 in *Dia. 25*. If Black omits this move, White will attack with 1 in *Dia. 32*. Black jumps to 2, but after Black 6, White defends the top with 7. Black's stones are still insecure and require more attention, so the chances are that White will be able to make another move to reinforce the territory at the top.

After Black has played the marked stone in *Dia. 33*, the best move White has at the top is 1. However, most of the weaknesses at the top remain and it is not a very strong attack against Black's four stones. Black will respond by jumping to the important point of 2.




Dia. 33



Dia. 34


Faced with these bleak prospects, Cho decided to make a checking extension from the top with 1 in *Dia. 34*. Black extended to 2, which struck at the weak underbelly of White's two stones below. This also presented a problem for Cho to resolve.


If White had played on the third line with the marked stone in *Dia. 35*, Black 3 would present no problems. White would simply take the corner territory with 4 (or A). In light of this, Black would have reconsidered his strategy of breaking up the left side with 1.



Dia. 35


If White had played the marked stone in *Dia. 36*, Black 1 would be the better move. The result seems to be even. The difference between this and *Dia. 23* is that the low position of the marked stone does not match White's moyo strategy. In *Dia. 36*, it will be easier for Black to erase White's moyo.






Dia. 37

Since the prospects of playing both White A and B in *Dia. 38* are not so promising, the other option White might have considered was simply not playing on the left side at all; rather, he could have opened up a new battlefield on the right by playing at 1. This is a principle that can be of great help: When you don't have a good move, play in the area where the fewest number of stones has been played. You will never go wrong applying this principle. But a word of caution is in order.




Dia. 38

Once White has played 1 in *Dia. 39*, Black cannot follow this principle and play elsewhere, omitting 2. Once a fight has begun, you must follow it out to the end. White A is just too good a move to allow; it defends White's weak stones below and the marked black stone comes under severe attack.




Dia. 39




Dia. 40

In response to the marked stone in *Dia. 40*, White 1 is the strongest attacking point. It also prevents Black from sliding to A. Unfortunately, Black can invade at 2 and live in the corner with the sequence to 8. In response to White 9, Black can extend to 10 or jump to B. White has to settle his shape with 11, so he ends in gote.

Cho attached with 1 in *Dia. 41*, then secured the corner with 3. There is still a bit of bad aji in the corner, so White has to be careful. Playing 3 at A would secure the corner without any bad aji, but playing 3 puts more pressure on the black stones above.



Dia. 41




Dia. 42


After exchanging 1 for Black 2, White 3 in *Dia. 42* is the severest move with respect to the black stones above. Unfortunately, this move lets Black live in the corner with the sequence

to 10. White would like to play at A, but he must connect at 9 first.

If White were to omit 9 in *Dia. 42* and play the marked stone in *Dia. 43*, Black would wedge in with 1. If White ataris with 2, Black ataris at 3. White connects at 4 and Black connects at 5. This sets up a capturing race.




Dia. 43




Dia. 44

White hanes with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 44*, but instead of connecting at 5, Black makes a placement at 4. White ataris with 5 and Black descends to 6. After the ataris of White 5 and 7, Black blocks at 8. If White resists with 9, Black ataris with 10 and White can't connect at A because he will still be in atari and Black will capture at B.



Dia. 45

12: at




Dia. 46

White 9 in *Dia. 45* also fails, but it takes a bit longer. Black ataris with 10 and, after White 11, ataris again with 12 where the marked stone was. This squeeze is known as the 'stone tower'. Next —

White captures a stone with 13 in *Dia. 46*, but he loses the capturing race by one move with the sequence to 18.


Attaching with 1 in *Dia. 47* is another move White might play. White settles his stones with the sequence to 9, but Black slides to 10 and his stones on the left are secure. Note that Black 6 is the best move; it takes the most territory and leaves White's corner open at the bottom. Black 6 at A would leave his stones

cramped, while, if Black 6 at 7, White can capture a stone with A.




Dia. 47

After 3 in *Dia. 41*, the white stones in the corner are settled and the black stones on the left are under attack. It is urgent for Black to defend them. Once they are secure, he can invade the top at A or B in *Dia. 48*. In my opinion, Black 1 was the best move.




Dia. 48

As it turned out, Kobayashi played 1 in the lower right in *Dia. 49* and Cho attacked the two stones on the left with 2, building up a moyo at the top. Black must now find a good answer to White 2.




Dia. 49

Black 1 in *Dia. 50* looks like a good defense, but Black's shape is defective; White 2 hits its weak point. If Black defends by crawling to 3, White cuts through with 4 and 6. Since Black can't capture the two white stones at 2 and 4, he must extend to 7, but the black stones on the left will probably die after White 8.




Dia. 50




Dia. 51

If Black blocks White from the top with 2 in *Dia. 51*, White will separate the marked stone from its allies above. This is a big move territorially; moreover the shape of Black's stones above is bad.



Dia. 52




Dia. 53


Black 2 in *Dia. 52* is the best way for Black to defend and make good shape. Although the

exchange of 1 for Black 4 is a minus for White, exchanging Black 2 for White 3 is much worse for Black because White strengthens his moyo at the top. White can next expand into the center with 5.

Black 2 in *Dia. 53* is the move that gives Black good shape. Black would be quite happy if White played 3. With the sequence to Black 10, White's stones above have become thin and Black can break through to the top by attaching with 12. This result would negate the meaning of White 1, which was to make a moyo at the top.



Dia. 54




Dia. 55

Kobayashi jumped to Black 1 in *Dia. 54*. White 2 (or A) was necessary to keep the black stones above separated from their allies below.

Locally, White 1 in *Dia. 55* is the vital point, but Black 2 is a much bigger move strategically because it has the potential for building a vast moyo in the center. Even if White can capture the marked stone with 3 and 5, it will be small in comparison with 2. Moreover, with Black having become strong on the outside, the bad aji in the corner will come to life.


For example, after White 5 in *Dia. 55*, Black can play the sequence to 5 in *Dia. 56* (next page), threatening to save the marked stone. It is unwise for White to capture the marked stone by defending at 6 because his corner position will collapse. If White does connect at 6, Black 7 is the safest way to attack. Black is satisfied with the large profit he gets with the sequence to 15.

Resisting with White 2 in *Dia. 57* is an overplay. After the sequence to Black 7, all of White's stones in the corner die.



Dia. 56

Dia. 57




Dia. 58

White 2 in *Dia. 58* seems better than the descent of White 2 in *Dia. 57*, but it is still


dangerous. Black can play strongly from 3 to 9, resulting in a capturing race. After Black 19, White can start a ko at A. If Black can win this ko, his group will end with a five-point eye space, so he will win the capturing race.

When White played the marked stone, Black jumped to 1 in *Dia. 59* and White drew back with 2 to prevent Black from cutting through his position and isolating his stones in the corner. Black had to fall back and defend with 3; if he omitted this move —

White would attach with 1 in *Dia. 60*. After the sequence to White 7, the black stones on the left side are isolated and in great danger.



Dia. 59



Dia. 60

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